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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

.-

V.

CaseNo.20110176-CA

PHILLIP J. FRANCIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant responds to the State's arguments in its brief, and contends that the
State's arguments fail to support the proposition that the church in this case qualified
as a dwelling under Utah's burglary statute.

I. UTAH'S BURGLARY STATUTE WOULD NOT
INCLUDE A CHURCH AS A DWELLING
The State first claims that defense counsel invited any error when she conceded
that the legislature might define the church as a dwelling. This claim is erroneous
because defense counsel never repudiated her argument that the church did not
constitute a dwelling under the statute. Additionally, the State's arguments supporting
the claim that the church was a dwelling misread the plain language of the statute and
misinterpret this Court's cases on the issue. The State's definition of dwelling expands
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it to the point of nullity to make any structure a dwelling, so long as a person actually
lives there.
A. Defense Counsel Did Not Invite the Court to Commit Error
The State contends that defense counsel conceded that a dwelling would
constitute a church, and thereby invited any error. Aple's Br. at 9-10. However, this
argument fails to put the discussion between the court and counsel into proper
context and neglects to refer to defense counsel's repeated argument to the court that
the building was not a dwelling.
First, defense counsel explicitly and repeatedly rejected the concession the State
claims she made. The entire discussion began when defense counsel indicated the sole
issue involved "whether or not this church was a dwelling." R. 50:123. The trial court
indicated that State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and State v. McNearney,
2011 UT App 4, 246 P.3d 532 based the analysis on the actual use of the structure, as
opposed to its traditional use. R. 50:123-25. Defense counsel agreed with the trial
court's statement that it should interpret the statute to find the building was not a
dwelling. R. 50:125. Defense counsel then stated that the building's "main use5' was as
a church—"[i]t is not, you know, classified as a dwelling. Everyone refers to it as a
church." R. 50:125. She then stated, "Your Honor, I would argue that the actual use of
that building is a church." R. 50:125.
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The trial court pointed out that church services occurred five to six days a week,
but that an individual resided in the building seven days a week. R. 50:126. Defense
counsel then conceded that Ms. Camacho's use of her part of the building was greater
than that used for church services. R. 50:126. Then, the trial court referred counsel to
the statute's definition of dwelling and defense counsel stated she thought "the
legislature under that definition would classify the church as a dwelling." R. 50:127.
However, immediately after that statement, defense counsel reiterated her argument
that the church would not constitute a dwelling.
I don't think we've had case law on this particular issue with these facts as we've
heard them today, but I would ask the Court to look at the use—the majority of
the building is used for church services and not for Ms. Camacho. While her
residence is in the basement, Pastor Narvaez also stated that... the majority of
those rooms are also used for churchgoers.
R. 50:127-28.
The invited error doctrine applies only when defense counsel leads the court
into making an error.
Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error. By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this
principle by 'discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court
so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal. ... Thus, encouraging
counsel to actively participate in all proceedings and to raise any possible error
at the time of its occurrence fortifies our long-established policy that the trial
court should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error.
Pratt v.Nelson, 2007 UT 41, J 17,164 P.3d 366 (quoting State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,
f 15, 128 P.3d 1171) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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added). Defense counsel must "lead the trial court into making the error." State v.
Carreno, 2005 UT App 208, 5 11,113 P.3d 1004. See also, State v. Montiel, 2004 UT
App 242, 5 14,95 P.3d 1216, aff d, 2005 UT 48,122 P.3d 571 ("Here, the State has not
demonstrated that defense counsel's conduct led the trial court into rejecting the plea
agreement..."). "Invited error generally occurs in a more affirmative manner, such as
where counsel stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly that there is no
objection to a specific ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous
authority upon which the court relies." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 23,164 P.3d 366
(emphasis added).
In this case, defense counsel never changed her argument. She never stopped
arguing that the church did not constitute a dwelling under the statute. She did not
waive an objection or withdraw her argument. While counsel expressed confusion
about the legislature's interpretation of the statute and felt that the courts had yet to
address the issue, she never waived or withdrew her contention that the church did
not constitute a dwelling.
In fact, after defense counsel argued the motion and well after the statement the
State claims operated as a concession of the issue, the court asked, "So let me just
make sure I'm clear. ... [Y]our ... argument is I should view this as a building rather
than as a dwelling and—and find that worst case scenario for Mr. Francis this should
be a third-degree felony rather than a second degree felony; is that right?" R. 50:131.
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Defense counsel said, "Yes, Your Honor. That's what I would ask." Id. The State then
argued the building constituted a dwelling, not a building. R. 50:131-34. Finally, the
court found that the church met the definition of a dwelling under the statute. R.
50:144.
At no point did defense counsel concede that the church constituted a dwelling
under the statute and the court never treated her statements as waiving that claim.
Thus, at no point did defense counsel lead the court into committing the error
Defendant claimed: that it should not have found the church constituted a dwelling
under the burglary statute. The court had ample opportunity, and in fact did, rule on
the issue. As the Supreme Court said, the trial court had "the first opportunity to
address a claim of error." Pratt, 2007 UT 41 at J 17.
B. The Common Law Supports Enhanced Offenses For Dwellings
The State contends that the definition of burglary of a dwelling is based solely
on the criminal code and that the common law has no relevance to the inquiry. Aple's
Br. at 11-12. Defendant concedes that the relevant inquiry involves a large degree of
statutory construction. However, the State is incorrect that the common law is
completely irrelevant to the case at hand.
"The common law, except as otherwise modified by statute is in force in this
state." State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 254 P. 142,143 (1927). The Utah Supreme Court
has commented on Utah's common law tradition regarding burglary, stating that "[a]t
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common law, the societal interests protected from burglary were the sanctity and
security of occupancy and the dwelling place." State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113,115 (Utah
1986).
Defendant did not cite the common law to contend that somehow it abrogated
the current statute. Rather, he attempted to give a context for why Utah's statute has
two levels of burglary. Dwelling houses have always been given special protection
because of the fear of terrorizing occupants. See Aplt's Br. at 7-10. Additionally, the
common law addressed the question of churches—something that Utah's statute fails
to mention. If Utah's statute is silent to the issue, the common law continues to
remain in force. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (West) ("The common law of England
so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or laws of the
United States, or the constitution or laws of this state, ... is hereby adopted, and shall
be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.") At common law, churches were
limitedly considered dwellings because they were seen to be houses of God, though
that concept was quickly abandoned. Aplt's Br. at 7-10. And, in fact, the only cases to
address the issue of whether a church qualifies as a dwelling for purposes of a burglary
have concluded that they do not. Id.
Contrary to the State's argument, if the statute is silent about whether a church
constitutes a dwelling for purposes of a burglary, then courts must look to the
common law. "Traditionally, the legislature may change the common law only
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explicitly." OLP, L.L.C. v. Birmingham, 2009 UT 75, J 16, 225 P.3d 177 (quoting
Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, f 29, 61 P.3d 989 (Durham, C.J., dissenting)). In fact,
contrary to the State's assertions, "[i]t is a fundamental principle that while the
legislature has the authority to abrogate the common law, every instance that a
statutory scheme and the common law converge does not necessarily mean the
legislature has abolished the common law." Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, f 16 n. 5,
234 P.3d 1147. The common law has extreme relevance because it helps appreciate
why burglary was gradated and why churches have not been treated as dwellings.
C. The Statute's Plain Language and this Court's Cases Do Not Support the
Assertion that Mere Occupancy Converts a Third-Degree Burglary into a
Second-Degree Burglary,
The State asserts that "whether a structure is a dwelling under the burglary
statutes depends on the actual use of the particular structure at issue, not the typical
use of similar structures." Aple's Br. at 14. This constitutes a fundamental misreading
of the cases and statute.
The State reads the statute in an anomalous way to contend that churches
somehow fit within the definition of "dwellings/5 so long as a person actually lives in
the church. Aple's Br. at 15-16. The statute defines buildings with its ordinary
meaning and also includes watercraft, aircraft, trailers, or other buildings "adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(l)(a) (West).
Clearly, the church was adapted so that it could accommodate persons staying
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overnight. Additionally, building includes "each separately secured or occupied
portion of the structure." Id. at (l)(a)(i). Ms. Camacho's residence, while not typically
part of a church, was the type of structure that had been "adapted for overnight
accommodation" and was a separate "occupied portion of the structure." The
legislature clearly meant to penalize burglary of normal buildings—even those that are
regularly occupied buildings—as third-degree felonies.
But the legislature chose to elevate the offense if the building constitutes a
dwelling. A dwelling is "a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging in
the building at night, whether or not a person is actually present." Id. at (2). The State
reads this portion of the statute to mean that if the building itself was "usually
occupied," then the structure would become a dwelling. Aple's Br. at 16. However, if
the legislature meant that, it would have said, "'Dwelling' means any building which a
person usually uses for lodging at night." However, the legislature made the
enhancement conditioned on the nature of the building itself, not on the nature of
how it actually is used: a dwelling is "a building which is usually occupied," not a
"building which a person usually occupies." The difference is critical.
The State's reasoning has been explicitly contravened by this Court in both
cases in which it has interpreted this statute. First, Cox specifically holds that the
typical use of the structure itself is the determinative factor.
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The term "usually occupied" refers to the purpose for which the structure is
used. If the structure is one in which people typically stay overnight, it fits
within the definition of dwelling under the burglary statute.
State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). In fact, this
Court emphasized that it was the nature of certain structures as traditional dwellings
that merited elevated protection as second-degree felonies:
Likewise, our second degree burglary statute is intended to protect people while
in places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to
protecting property in buildings such as stores, business offices, or garages.
Id. (emphasis added). People are not likely to be living and sleeping overnight in
churches, stores, offices, or garages. But they are likely to be living and sleeping
overnight in homes, cabins, condos, and apartment buildings. Thus, Cox's analysis
hinges on the ordinary or customary use of the building itself.
In McNearney, the structure itself was one which people traditionally occupy—
a completed, but never lived in home. State v. McNearney, 2011 UT App 4,246 P.3d
532. This Court held that the defendant still committed a third degree burglary (and
not a second degree) because the house had never actually been occupied. Id. at J 9.
Important to the Court was Cox's focus on '"the purpose for which the structure is
used,' and whether 'the structure is one in which people typically stay overnight."5 Id.
(emphasis in original). Since no one had used the home, and since the home was not
presently occupied, it did not constitute a dwelling under the statute. Id. at f J 10-11.
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Both cases support the propositions as argued in Mr. Francis's opening briefthat churches do not constitute dwellings, even if occupied by a person. Aplt's Br. at
11-16. That is because churches are not structures "in which people typically stay
overnight." McNearney, 2011 UT App 4 at 5 9.
In response to defendant's equal protection argument, the State alleges that
crimes may often be enhanced based on circumstances unaware to the defendant,
such as rape of a child under age 14. Aple's Br. at 17. However, this argument does not
address the equal protection concern at issue here.
A defendant may rape someone unaware of the fact that the child was under
age 14. However, all defendants who rape children under the age of 14 would receive
the same charge, whether they knew the child's age or not. In the case of this statute,
however, two defendants may rob similar structures—a warehouse for example. In
one case, the defendant would receive a third degree felony. In another, if part of that
warehouse had a residence for a security guard, that defendant would receive a second
degree felony. Both defendants committed the same crime and one receives a more
severe sanction merely because a person happened to live there. "A law does not
operate uniformly if'persons similarly situated' are not 'treated similarly' ..." Gallivan
v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, f 37, 54 P.3d 1069 (quoting Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577
(Utah 1993). "Both the federal and state constitutions require that similarly situated
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individuals be treated alike under the law unless there is a reasonable basis for treating
them differently." State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995).
Under the State's reading of the statute, the equal protection argument becomes
a problem. However, under Defendant's reading of the statute, it never becomes an
issue. If someone burglarizes a structure that typically houses people—homes, condos,
apartments—then all similarly situated persons receive the same charge, as the statute
says, "whether or not a person is actually present." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2). If
someone burglarizes a structure in which people do not typically sleep—a garage,
office, or a church—then he would receive a third degree burglary, again regardless of
whether a person actually sleeps there.
The State claims that the legislature intended to "protect persons where they
usually sleep, in any form that sleeping place might take." Aple's Br. at 18. To the
State, "the actual use of that particular structure" can make a building a dwelling.
However, under this reading of the statute, the watercraft, aircraft, and other buildings
"adapted for overnight accommodation of persons," which would all be third degree
felonies according to the statute, automatically become dwellings so long as a person
actually stays there. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(l)(a). This argument completely
eviscerates 76-6-201(l)(a)'s definition of building, which frequently references
situations in which the structure has been adapted for people to live and stay in.
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In addition, under the State's theory, a viaduct might qualify as a dwelling
under the statute since homeless persons often sleep there. The State's definition of
dwelling would also include a car, or an office, restaurant, or garage—so long as a
person actually sleeps in the structure. However, the difference lies in the typical use of
the structure. Dwellings are structures that people typically sleep in. The statute's
definition of building includes buildings that people sleep in as well, but buildings are
not structures typically used for sleeping. Similarly, churches are not buildings that are
typically used for overnight accommodation. As such, the church in this case fits
cleanly into the statute's definition of building—a structure which has been "adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons," and consequently, remains a third degree
felony under Utah law. Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-201(l)(a).
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Francis asks this Court to find that the church does
not qualify as a dwelling under Utah's burglary statute and find that the trial court
erroneously convicted him of second degree burglary.
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2011.

SAMUEL P. NEWTON
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201
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76-6-201. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) (a) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft,
trailer, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or
for carrying on business and includes:
(i) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and
(ii) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle,
(b) "Building" does not include a railroad car.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the
building at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) "Enter or remain unlawfully" means a person enters or remains in or on any
premises when:
(a) at the time of the entry or remaining, the premises or any portion of the premises
are not open to the public; and
(b) the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises
or any portion of the premises.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
(5) "Railroad car":
(a) in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes a sleeping car or any container or
trailer that is on a railroad car; and
(b) includes only a railroad car that is operable and part of an ongoing railroad
operation.
Amended by Chapter 366, 2008 General Session
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ADDDENDUM B
Transcription of Electronically Recorded Proceeding
February 8,2011
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THE COURT:

Okay.

Then, Ms. Mills, you go

MS. MILLS:

Your Honor, the Court has

ahead.

heard the testimony today by the witnesses that the
State has presented.

I think it's clear that

Mr. Francis, we would agree and concede, that he was
in the church without permission.

He was found there

and taken into custody there.
I think the issues that the Court needs to
address are, first and foremost, whether or not this
church was a dwelling.
Common law has said that buildings -outbuildings on certain property enclosed in the same
fence as a home are a dwelling, but I've been unable
to find any current case law addressing this current
situation,
THE COURT:

I don't have a case that

addresses our fact pattern, but let me refer you to a
case of State versus McCearny.
MS. MILLS:

I have that, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do you?

I'm looking down at

what I think Lexis has deemed paragraph 9.

This is

the Court of Appeals commenting on the District
Court's analysis.

And the Court of Appeals says:

disagree with the District Court's conclusion that
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Cox -- this is the case that the District Court
relied upon -- made a structures type or the purpose
for which it was built the determining

factor in

applying the dwelling definition.
To the contrary, Cox spoke of the purpose
for which the structure is used and whether

the

structure is, o n e , in which people typically

stay

overnight.
T h u s , the focus under Cox is on the actual
use of the particular structure that is burglarized,
not on the usual use of similar

types of structures.

And then they refer to a case of State
versus Cates, parenthetically

noting the holding

that

a camping trailer rented for the fall deer hunt was
equipped for overnight lodging and was when
and parked usually occupied by a person

rented

lodging

therein at night.
And so although Cox made it clear
continuous and current occupation

that

is not needed, it

did not address the particular fact

situation.

And I don't think that the facts either in
McCearny or Cox are on point with the facts that we
have in our case, but I think the language of actual
use as opposed

to usual use of similar

types of

structures is important to focus on.
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With that said, what would you like me to
consider with regard to McCearny?
familiar with the opinion.

You said you're

So is your view that

McCearny lends itself to this Court interpreting

this

structure as being a building rather than a dwelling?
MS. MILLS:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And how is it that I reconcile

that with the language contained here when the actual
use of the church in this case was for someone to
stay overnight?
MS. MILLS:

Your Honor, I think my view is

that-we've heard testimony today that it is a church.
That is its, you know, main use today.

And I would

just ask the Court to consider the fact that it is a
church.
dwelling.

It is not, you know, classified as a
Everyone refers to it as a church.
The portion in which my client entered the

building was the church portion.

And I think I would

just ask that you look at it as the use that it's
really referred to as.
THE COURT:

What?

The usual use --

MS. MILLS:

Your Honor --

THE COURT:

—

MS. MILLS:

Your Honor, I would argue that

or the actual use?.

the actual use of that building is a church.
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THE COURT:

Well, that's one of its uses

certainly, but not the only use.
MS. MILLS:

I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

So when we have these hybrid

situations, what is your view in terms of which use
trumps the other?

I mean, if we have church

services

being held, I think the testimony was -- let me just
flip back.

I think there was testimony offered

that

services -- oh, goodness, I know I wrote it down.
MS. MILLS:

I believe services are held

five to six days a week, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday,

Saturday and Sunday,- and certainly not all day.
MS. MILLS:

Correct.

THE COURT:

You don't disagree with that.

MS. MILLS:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay,

But we have an

individual who resides there seven days a week all
day.
MS. MILLS:

I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

So if I'm comparing these

uses, which use in your view would be the more -- and
I'm not saying this is the right standard, because
I'm--

again, I'm not getting into splitting hairs in

terms of number of days and number of hours.
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mean, just to carry out your argument, if--- if it's
being used more for overnight, more for dwelling,
because Ms. Camacho's there all the time, and
services only occur periodically

throughout the week,

which of those two uses do you view as being the more
primary?
MS. MILLS:

Your Honor, I would concede

that Ms. Camacho's residence would.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Have you looked at also

the definition contained in 76-6-201, sub 2, where
the legislature has under the burglary

statute

specifically defined what a dwelling is?
MS. MILLS:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Tell me what your view is of

that definition as we talk about this dwelling issue.
MS. MILLS:

Your Honor, I understand

that - - I think that the legislature under that
definition would classify the church as a dwelling.
And certainly the statute itself, as far as burglary
is concerned, takes into account any portion of the
building.
Your Honor, as I stated, I don't think
that we've had case law on this particular issue with
these facts as we've heard them today, but I would
ask the Court to look at the use -- the majority of
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the building is used for church services and not for
Ms. Camacho.

While her residence is in the basement,

Pastor Narvaez also stated that, you know, the
majority of those rooms are also used for
churchgoers.
And I guess I would just rest with regard
to that argument and continue, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Please.

MS. MILLS:

The next issue that I see

is -- are the gloves that are allegedly found on
Mr. Francis.

There are no gloves in evidence that we

can see, Your Honor, and it's disputed -- Officer
Christensen testified that he wasn't sure if there
had been, any gloves on Mr. Francis.
The other witnesses, as far as Mr. -- or,
excuse me, Pastor Narvaez and Officer Martin are
concerned, yes, there were, we don't know what type.
Your Honor, as I said, there's -- there's
no argument as to whether or not my client was found
in the building.

I don't know that intent has been

established with regard to why he was there.
Under the statute, as the Court knows, the
intent must be formed prior to entering the building.
I would argue that intent for burglary of
a dwelling, burglary of a building, and also criminal
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trespass, which is a Class A misdemeanor, all contain
that intent, you know, if it were to be something
different beforehand, one just has to enter the
building.
I don't think that there is any solid
evidence today that has shown that my client went in
with the intent or formed it while he was there to
steal anything.

Nothing was stolen, nothing was

missing, and nothing was found on his person.
THE COURT:

What would be the reasonable

inference to draw from your client's presence in this
particular structure at three in the morning wearing
the clothing that was described in the area of the
building that he was found in?

What -- if I were to

draw an inference, which I'm certainly entitled to
do, albeit a reasonable inference, what would the
reasonable inference be?
MS. MILLS:

Your Honor, first I would like

to point out that the type of clothing that my client
was wearing was never fully described and established
and recalled.
I think that there are also arguments to
make, I'm not sure that it -- it does direct just to
committing a burglary.
I think presence in a church in the wee
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hours of the morning, you know, is something that's
possible in other churches that's appropriate.

And I

think that given the fact that, you know, Mr. Francis
had attended this church on occasion and had been
there as it was a church, there may not be any sort
of inference with regard to him committing a theft or
felony.
THE COURT:

Wouldn't that -- wouldn't that

increase his knowledge or awareness if he's been to
this particular church before, he would know that
this is not a church where you can come in at all
hours of the night to pray, for example, or seek
refuge from bad weather?

I mean, wouldn't he have a

better understanding of the -- the church and how it
operates?
MS. MILLS:
certainly should.

He would, Your Honor.

And he

I don't think that that follows,

though, that there is still that, inference that he
intended to commit a felony or theft.

I think it's

also still possible -- and I'd like the Court to
consider -- the lesser included offense of criminal
trespass.
THE COURT:

Okay.

What else?

MS. MILLS:

Your Honor, I think I would

just close by asking, again, the Court to consider
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any lesser included offenses based on the lack of
intent that the State has shown today.
And I would rest, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
clear.

Thank you.

So let me just make sure I'm

Your - - your position is, first and foremost,

I ought to be looking at this as a criminal trespass..
But if, in fact, I determine that there was some ill
intent possessed by your client, then your secondary
argument is I should view this as a building rather
than as a dwelling and -- and find that worst case
scenario for Mr. Francis this should be a
third-degree felony rather than a second-degree
felony; is that right?
MS. MILLS:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT

Okay.

MS. MILLS

Thank you.

THE COURT

Mr . Heward?

That's what

I would ask

MR. HEWARD:

All right.

Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Judge, initially in response before I go
through the facts -- initially in response to
Counsel's argument and the discussion that Your Honor
engaged with her in regards to what constitutes -- or
whether the church at 2324 Adams constitutes for our
purposes as a dwelling.

I'm glad that the Court
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referred counsel to part 2 of the Utah Criminal Code
76-6-201, sub 2.

And I would suggest to. you, Your

Honor, when you go through that meaning, which it
says specifically:

Dwelling means to a building

which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the
building at night whether or not the person is
actually present.
The reason that I don't think that Your
Honor finds or defense counsel finds an exact fact
pattern like this reported in the decisions in the
State of Utah is because this definition makes it
very clear on what a dwelling is.
Applying that definition to the facts of
this, there is no evidence that these are any way
separated.

It is a single building with entrances.
You can

see from the photographs that when

you walk in the front door, you walk down the stairs
to the basement level, which we've talked about, or
you walk upstairs to the main level.

There is no

question that Lupe Camacho, in fact, resides there.
She has a separate room with a door on it that locks.
She has access to a kitchen.

She has access to a

bathroom.
You can see the inside of her room is just
that.

It is her room.

It has a desk.
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chairs.

It has a bed.

It has clothing.

It has

everything indicating that that is, in fact -- and
she testifies and there's evidence from Pastor as
well, this is where she lives every single day.
It is, as the statute says, a building
which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the
building at night.
And I would suggest to you that if this -has come up before, which it may well have -- that it
is resolved by going to that definition, because I do
believe it covers specifically what we're talking
about.
If you were to take the argument raised by
counsel, I would suggest you could argue that to the
absurdity.
In other words, I could come to your home,
I could enter at three a.m., and as long as I only
entered into your living room then I wouldn't be
committing a burglary of a dwelling because I'm not
entering into the area where you were sleeping.

And

I think that, in essence, shows why this is
unquestionably a dwelling for purposes of a
second-degree felony.
I —

I have not had the benefit of reading

the case that you cited to, Your Honor.
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frankly, I didn't do that because it would be the
State's position that the statute covers whether or
not this is, in fact, a dwelling.
Having -- having advanced that, Your
Honor, this is a question -- again, as counsel says,
there is no question that her client enters without
permission.

He enters at three a.m.

He forcibly

enters through one of the two windows.
You have evidence before you that there
were tools -- whether they were recovered by the
police or not -- that were used for purposes —
think circumstantially

I

-- to get into the windows.

You can see by looking at the photographs,
it is an older building.

They are heavy, wood-framed

windows; they are going to be somewhat difficult to
open .
You can also see from the photograph -and the testimony was -- there was a damage to a
window that was done.

And you can see that -- where

they are painted, there is actually new wood that has
been splintered off that.
THE COURT:

Does that make a difference in

terms of analyzing whether or not the entry was
lawful or unlawful?
MR. HEWARD:

No, it doesn't.
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THE COURT:
MR. HEWARD:
THE COURT:

I mean -Not at all .
-- I'm just trying to

understand - - I mean, I guess it makes it perhaps
more egregious-MR. HEWARD:
THE COURT:

Egregious.
-- that it was a forced entry.

But the reality is there's been no testimony that he
was allowed to be there at that time of -MR. HEWARD:

The windows could have been

open, the doors could have been unlocked and wide
open, and it makes no difference whatsoever.
What it does show, I think, Your Honor, is
someone who goes through a certain amount of
planning, someone who goes there with gloves on so
that when he is opening these windows and they do
splinter, the heavier gloves will keep his hands from
picking those splinters up or getting cut and
possibly leaving evidence behind.
It also shows a certain amount of planning
of someone who takes instruments with him for
purposes of getting into that.

The inference being

this isn't just a spur of the moment thing.
There is no evidence that, in fact, he
walks by here and goes, oh, hey, why don't I go in
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1

and go pray?

2

would suggest to you that's not a reasonable

3

i nference to draw.

4

There's no evidence from that, and I

He had been there repeatedly.

5

there were standard hours.

6

services that were provided..

7

things.

8
9

He knew

He knew there were
He knew all of those

And, Judge, he also knew several other
things.

He knew what was inside of the building.

He

10

knew that there were valuable instruments.

11

there were computers.

12

He knew there was money.

13

because he'd previously been in that building and had

14

an opportunity to see that.

15
16

THE COURT:

He knew there were printers.
He knew all of those things

Perhaps that someone was

residing downstairs as well.

17

MR. HEWARD:

18

he knew or

19

Camacho resided there.

20

He knew

Correct.

I don't know what

didn't know about whether or not Lupe

I would suggest to you that if his intent

21

was to get something to eat, which would still

22

satisfy the intent to steal, that he would know that

23

he would go to the lower level because that's the

24

only place where a kitchen is located.

25

evidence that he did that, Judge.

There's no

He specifically
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stayed upstai rs.
He specifically chose to go there at
approximately, as Lupe testified, 2:20 a.m.

It is

about 30 to 40 minutes between the time that she
says —

and, again, I don't have any evidence that

her cell phone is exactly correct, but she does
testify she looks at it.

And for about 30 to 40

minutes he is inside of the church.

She can hear him

moving about.
Again, we don't have evidence that he -of what he was doing.

I would suggest to you that he

was doing a natural and logical inferences drawn from
that.

He was looking for the items.

the place.

He was casing

He was deciding what it was he was going

to take and how he was going to get it out of there.
There is direct evidence before Your Honor
on certain of the elements and there is
circumstantial evidence before you on other ones,
specifically what was his intent.
Again, we pointed out through the pastor
that he had had an issue before in which money had
come up missing.

He had had times when he had been

at the church and knew what was there for the
purposes of taking.
If he wanted food, he knew that he could
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go there when it was open.

If he wanted solace, he

knew that he could go there when it was open.
Judge, individuals who are out at three
a.m. at any location opening windows which are closed
and they're having to use some form of a tool are
showing to you that they are going to do whatever is
necessary for purposes of getting into that
particular location.
His motives are not good.
not honest.

His motives are

His motives are exactly what they speak.
The middle of the night, a heavy coat on.

Why does he have a heavy coat on?

Does he have a

heavy coat on perhaps so that in the event while he's
going through the -- the window that he's pried open
he doesn't again end up getting cut?

Don't know.

But he doesn't have a coat on because it's cold
outside.
Does he have a heavy coat on so that he
can perhaps hide things underneath it as he's leaving
and moving to another location?

I would suggest that

is a possibility.
Why does he have gloves on?

And -- and

you asked the question, what is the significance,
Officer, of the heavy gloves versus the latex gloves?
And the officer testified very specifically, his
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experience was heavy gloves for purposes of not
getting injured while they're getting in; latex
gloves for purposes of handling things and not
leaving fingerprints behind.
We would suggest that when you look at the
facts that the Court has, draw the natural and
logical inferences, Your Honor, this defendant did
enter a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Mills, anything - - I guess - - I guess,
Mr. Heward, it threw me off that you reserved.
Usually he would go first, then you, and then he
again.

But we went out of order that way, so -All right.

Mr. Francis, let me -- let me

summarize for you the findings that I have made as
I've listened to the testimony.
The Court heard from three witnesses:
Lupe Camacho, who identified herself and who has been
identified as the caretaker of this particular church
located at 2324 Adams Avenue here in Ogden.
The Court heard from Pastor Narvaez, who
was the State's second witness and who described
being called to the church in the early morning hours
by Ms. Camacho when she felt that an intruder had
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come into the building.
The Court heard from Officer Zachary
Martin, and also from Officer Clint Chri st'ensen.
I don't think, based on the evidence
that's been presented —

and as, Ms. Mills, you

conceded -- there's any doubt in the Court's mind
that Mr. Francis was inside this particular

structure

in the early morning hours back in June of 2010,
specifically June 25th of 2010.
There's been no testimony that provides
the Court with any basis upon which to conclude that
Mr. Francis's presence in the church was authorized
by anyone.
In fact, the testimony has been that the
church was locked.

Ms. Camacho testified that she

locks it routinely every night, both windows and
doors, and recalls following that protocol or pattern
on the day in question.
There's been no evidence presented that
the defendant, Mr. Francis,obtained

verbal

permission from anybody to be in the church for any
reason other than during ordinary business hours or
church service hours.
I think most significantly to the Court,
in terms of all the evidence that has been presented,
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is the condition that Mr. Francis was found in at the
time he was located and placed under arrest.
The reason the Court asked Officer Martin
about the gloves particularly

is because in the

Court's view it would not be unusual for an
individual, especially if the individual was someone
who didn't have a place to keep his personal
belongings, to walk around with coats and gloves and
other things because of an inability to keep those
things somewhere safe.
And so initially, although the Court finds
it incredibly unusual and odd that in June
Mr. Francis would have both a coat on and gloves, it
was in the early morning hours, although the officer
testified that it was not cold, and, in fact, he did
not have a coat on.
But the gloves that the Court finds
significant are the latex gloves that were retrieved
from Mr. Francis.

Apparently there were several sets

of those latex gloves.

And initially the Court had

some questions in its mind about the significance of
those gloves.
Officer Martin testified, based on his
extensive training and experience in participating in
the investigations involving burglaries and/or
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1

thefts, that latex gloves were significant to him

2

because they are the type of glove that an individual

3

would use to pick through items and -- and be able

4

to —

5

behind, and that a bulkier, thicker glove would be a

6

glove commonly used by an individual seeking entry

7

into a structure to -- to prevent either damage to

8

that individual's hands, or because of the need to

9

use tools or instruments that would be easier to use

10 '
11

to do so without leaving any fingerprints

with thicker, more padded gloves.
There's been really no description of what

12

those gloves looked like, other than they were black,

13

so I really don't even know that they were thicker in

14

terms of the latex gloves.

15

significant that they were different than the gloves

16

found on Mr. Francis's persons, specifically in his

17

pant - - pant pockets.

18

But I think it is

I think Mr. Heward is correct when he says

19

it really doesn't matter what Mr. Francis was there

20

to take, if, in fact, I find that he was there to

21

take something.

22

have been money.

23

could have been donations.

24

additional set of clothing that he could have just as

25

easily gone in during the morning or afternoon hours

It could have been food.

It could

It could have been a computer.

It

It could have been an
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and asked to be provided by the pastor.

But the

point is is that whatever it was that he was there to
take, he was taking without permission, and that
makes the taking unauthorized.
So then the question becomes, as Ms. Mills
has suggested, is it fair -- is it reasonable to -to conclude or draw the inference, Mr. Francis, that
you were there to take something rather than there
for some other reason?

And in that regard, I suppose

it could be argued that there are a variety of other
reasons why you were there.
Perhaps just to give some illustrations,
you could have been there to use the restroom, or you
could have been there because you needed shelter.
There are a lot of other scenarios.
But in this particular case, what tilts
the Court in favor of drawing a reasonable

inference

that you were there with ill motives to take
something, to steal, is the fact that you had these
latex gloves on you, and there's been testimony

that

there were some tools found that were left at the
scene that were brought to gain access, which would
suggest that the decision to make entry was made in
advance, not a spur of the moment, I'm passing by the
church and I really need to use the restroom,
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see if the window's open, climb in, use the

restroom

and then leave.
The presence of tools, the presence of the
latex gloves, would suggest to this Court that
was something

that was planned

that was just spontaneously

rather than

occurring

this

something

as you

happened

by the -- the church in the early morning hours of
June 25th.
That then takes the Court to the next
of the analysis, and that is whether or not
structure should
dwelling.
contained

be characterized

this

as a building or a

And I think that both the
in McCearny

part

language

and the language contained

in

the statute itself offer clear support for the
Court's conclusion

that while this building w a s , in

fact, a building used for church-related

functions,

meals, church services, donations and other
there is no question

that this is also a building

which is -- as the statute says -- usually
by a person lodging

in the building

occupied

at night.

And I think the testimony
uncontroverted

events,

is.-- is

that M s . Camacho has been living

in

the building for some time, has been serving as the
caretaker, has her own separate bedroom, and is
allowed

-- or uses the bathroom

that's d o w n s t a i r s , is
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1

also authorized -- also uses the kitchen area

2

downstairs as her own personal kitchen.

3

I think that was - - i t was interesting to

4

the Court -- and certainly this isn't a legal

5

opinion, but I thought it was interesting -- that

6

Pastor Narvaez said during his testimony that he

7

considered this to be Lupe's home, that that's how he

8

views it, as opposed to she's just renting a room or

•9

something of that nature, that he characterized

10

as her home.

11

been provided suggests to the Court that this, in

12

fact, was a dwelling, as that term is defined under

13

76-6-201, sub 2.

14

this

And I think that the testimony that has

With this being a dwelling and with the

15

Court drawing the reasonable inference that

16

Mr. Francis was in the building at 3:00 in the

17

morning for -- in order to or with intent to commit,

18

in the Court's view, a theft, based on the condition

19

he was found in, the Court would find that the State

20

has met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt and

21

would find the defendant guilty of burglary, a

22

second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code

23

Annotated 76-6-202.

24
25

Now, with that said, Ms. Mills, I would be
inclined, unless you have a different suggestion, to
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